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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia, June 26-27, 1967 
SECTION ONE 
1. Joe Hardluck was seriously injured and his car 
demolished while he was driving to work at the Newport News Toy •oat 
Factory. The accident, which occurred at an intersection, was 
quite unusual in that Hardluck's automobile was hit on both sides 
at virtually the same instant by two different vehicles which were 
approaching in opposite directions from a cross street. One of 
the cars was driven by Freddie Fastback, a 23-year old youth 
notorious for his disregard of the traffic laws. The other one 
was driven by Cataract McGoo, an aged veteran of the Spanish-
American War. Both Fastback and McGoo were charged with reckless 
driving as a result of the accidents. At the traffic hearing the 
infirm but honest McGoo pleaded guilty to the traffic charge and 
paid a fine. Fastback, fearing the revocation of his driving 
privileges, pleaded not guilty and vigorously defended the charge. 
He was, however, convicted of reckless driving.-
In a civil action brought by Hardluck against Fastback and 
McGoo·, Hardluck, in an appropriate manner, sought to show as 
evidence of negligence Fastback's conviction of reckless driving and 
McGoo's plea of guilty to that charge. 
(a) Is evidence of Fastback's conviction of reckless 
driving admissible? 
(b) Is evidence of McGoo's plea of guilty admissible? 
2. Plaintiff, Administrator of the Estate of Roy Smith, 
instituted a death-by-wrongful-act action against Al Prufrock in the 
Circuit Court of Rockingham County, Virginia. The evidence showed 
that Prufrock drove his truck with a load of logs to Smith's lumber 
yard. Shortly after receiving instructions from Smith as to where 
to unload the logs, Prufrock released the log chain preparatory to 
unloading the logs, and immediately one of them rolled off the 
truck. Smith, who had walked away from a position in front of the 
truck toward an office building to its left, had returned without 
Prufrock's knowledge to a position on the left side of the truck 
and was crushed to death by the log which rolled off. 
In an effort to show that Prufrock was negligent, Plaintiff 
called him as an adverse witness. Prufrock testified to the above 
facts and that Smith had directed him to undo the chain and unload 
the logs. This evidence, which was neither contradicted nor cor-
roborated, was all the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff in the 
case as to the occurrence of the accident. 
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When the Plaintiff rested his case, Prufrock moved the 
court to strike Plaintiff's evidence on the ground that Prufrock's 
testimony, which was binding on the Plaintiff, showed that Prufrock 
was guilty of no actionable negligence. Prufrock's motion was 
opposed by Plaintiff on the ground that Prufrock's testimony was 
not corroborated by other evidence. 
How should the court rule on Plaintiff 1 s objection 
to the motion? 
3. An automobile driven by Smith, and in which Plaintiff 
was riding, collided with one driven by Jones in the City of 
Radford, Virginia. Smith died as a result of injuries received in 
the accident. Johnson, a resident of Roanoke County, quali_f'ied 
in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County as Administrator of Smith's 
Estate. Plaintiff, Smith and Jones were all residents of 
Montgomery County. 
Plaintiff instituted in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County 
an action against Johnson as Admin,istrator of Smith's Estate and 
against Jones as joint defendants, seeking to recover for his 
personal injuries sustained in the accident. The defendants filed 
pleas in abatement in proper form in which they alleged that the 
cause of .action-did not arise in Roanoke County but in the City of 
Radford; that Jones did not reside in Roanoke County but in 
Montgomery Coun"j:;y; and that the personal residence of the defendant 
administrator, Johnson, was not sufficient to afford proper venue 
in the case. 
(a) How should the court rule on the pleas in abatement? 
(b) List all proper venues for this cause of action and 
state the basis of each. 
(c) State the time limitation and the pleading stage at 
which a plea in abatement may be properly filed. 
4. On January 1, 1964, Patrick received what was believed 
to be minor injuries in an automobile accident while a guest in 
Henry 1 s car. Because of the friendship of the parties Patrick 
neither instituted an action against Henry nor tried to effect a 
compromise settlement. While filling out his income tax return on 
April 15, 1966, Patrick became ill and 3 days later he died. His 
attending physician concluded that the accident in 1964 was a 
proximate cause of his death. The executor of Patrick's estate 
instituted a death-by-wrongful-act action against Henry on June 5, 
1967, in the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia. 
With respect to how the accident occurred Plaintiff merely 
alleged: "Henry operated his automobile in which Patrick was a. 
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guest in a grossly negligent manner, and as a proximate result of 
his gross negligence Patrick died." 
Henry demurred to the motion for judgment on the ground that 
it was not sufficient in law in that it did not set forth the 
manner in which Henry was grossly negligent. He also filed a plea 
in which he alleged that the action was barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations, without specifying the particular statute 
relied upon. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the plea. 
(a) How ought the court to rule on the demurrer? 
(b) How ought the court to rule on the motion to strike 
the plea? 
5. Jane Accused was indicted for embezzlement on April 
1, 1967, in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Virginia. She 
was thereafter arrested pursuant to a capias issued on the indict-
ment. Before arraignment her attorney moved the court to quash 
the indictment on the ground that there had been no preliminary 
hearing prior to her indictment. 
How shoulQ the court rule? 
6. Plaintiff, a citizen of New York, brought an action at 
law in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County, Virginia, against 
Happy, a citizen of North Carolina, and against Lucky, a citizen 
of Virginia, for $50,000, for breach of contract. Three weeks 
after the Defendants had filed their respective grounds of defense, 
Plaintiff dismissed the action as to Lucky. Happy consults you 
and tells you that he would prefer to have his case tried in the 
federal court. 
State how, if at all, you as attorney for Happy may get the 
case transferred to the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Virginia. 
7. On the trial of an action at law, the record showed 
only the following proceedings in the Circuit Court with reference 
to a question asked a witness: 
Counsel for plaintiff: "Where were you on the night of 
this occurrence?' 
Counsel for defendant: "I object." 
Court: "Objection overruled." 
(a) Assume that there was an adverse judgment and 
counsel for the defendant applied to the Supreme Court of 
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Appeals for a writ of error (appeal)J and assigned 
this action of the Circuit Court as error. 
What answer ought counsel for the plaintiff make 
to this assignment? 
(b) Assume that instead of overruling the objectionJ 
the record showed only: "Objection sustained"J and connsel 
for the plaintiff assigned this action as cross-error. 
What answer ought counsel for the defendant make 
to this assignment? 
8. In a chancery suit in the Circuit Court a final decree 
was entered on June lJ 1967J finding among other things that "Jane 
SmithJ as widow of Robert Smith, is entitled to dower in Whiteacre." 
The term of court adjourned June 20th. The finding as to Jane 
Smith was clearly erroneous, as the record showed that Robert Smith 
had only a life estate in Whiteacre. 
You are consulted on June 26th as to how, if at all, this 
finding may now be corrected in the Circuit Court over the 
objection of Jane Smith. 
9. Joseph Dokes was counsel of record for William Smoot 
in a suit for the specific performance of a contract for sale of 
real estate. The defendant, Sally Blake, a spinstrees seventy 
years of age, was represented by Hobson Moat. Dokes had known 
Miss Blake for a number of years and he personally felt that it was 
to her advantage to settle the case. He, therefore, called on Miss 
Blake one evening and told her that he felt his client had an 
excellent opportunity to win the suit, but in order to avoid the 
expense and uncertainty of litigation he had advised his client 
to pay to Miss Blake an additional One Thousand Dollars for the 
property. Miss Blake, being rather timid and desiring to avoid the 
unpleasantness of litigation, promptly agreed to convey the 
property to Dokes' client upon the payment of the alleged agreed 
consideration plus an additional One Thousand Dollars. Dokes 
promptly prepared a short written agreement in his own handwriting 
and procured Sally Blake's signature to it. Upon learning of 
Dokes' visit to his client, Moat addressed the court, in the 
presence of Dokes, and was highly critical of Dokes' conduct. There-
upon Dokes addressed the court, stating that Moat had been away on 
vacationJ that he, DokesJ was interested in the welfare of Miss 
BlakeJ as he had known her for a long time, and that the settlement 
was advantageous to the parties and would result in saving the time 
of the court. Dokes called upon Moat for an apology for his 
critical remarks. 
Was Dokes entitled to an apology? 
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10. Scrounge was in the salvage business in Virginia and 
had for sale fifty rare cuspidors from a famous sporting house. 
On October 10, he wrote Wheeler of Rome, Georgia, and Delk of 
Atlanta, Georgia, identical letters offering for sale to each one 
twenty-five cuspidors at a stated price and advising that his offer 
could be accepted by their dating and signing the letter of ·offer and 
mailing it back to Scrounge. Both Wheeler and Delk dated and signed 
the letters on October 12. Wheeler mailed his letter direct to 
scrounge, and Delk sent his to his branch office in Virginia and 
Delk's agent delivered the same to Scroung~,both being received by 
Scrounge on October 14. Meanwhile, Scrounge had disposed of the 
cuspidors under such circumstances that under Georgia law, he would 
be liable for a breach of contract but under Virginia law, he would 
not be liable for a breach of contract. 
Is Scrounge liable to either Wheeler or Delk or to both? 
FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia, June 26-27, 1967 
QUESTIONS 
SECTION TWO 
1. Jason had just completed a storebuilding in Roanoke 
when he was approached by Klein to lease it to him. The parties 
discussed possible terms of the lease such as the rental and how 
it should be paid, the duration of the lease, liability for 
repairs and utilities, and finally Klein said: "We can agree on 
all those matters later on and have our lawyers put them in the 
written lease. 11 Jason said: "All right", and thereupon wrote the 
following, which was signed by both parties: "We agree that 
Jason will lease to Klein his new storebuilding upon terms to be 
agreed upon and set out in a written lease. Witness our hands and 
seals." 
Before anything further was done, Klein was offered a more 
desirable building at a lower rental and wrote Jason that he would 
not proceed with the proposed rental of his building. 
Has Jason_any cause of action against Klein? 
2. A, B, C, and D, owning a majority of the common stock 
of the Venus Corporation and desiring to control its activities, 
executed the following document: 11 In consideration that each of us 
shall constitute Z as Trustee to vote our stock in the Venus 
Corporation, we do hereby irrevocably constitute the said Z as our 
trustee for four years to vote our said stock." 
A became dissatisfied and sought by appropriate proceedings 
to revoke Z's authority to vote his stock. 
Over the objection of B, C and D, should he be successful? 
3. A deed dated January 2, 1910, and duly recorded, con-
veyed a farm in Virginia to William'' Payne "For his life and at his 
death to Joseph Brown." Carl Foreman took a fancy to this farm, and 
in 1925 bought it from Payne, receiving and recording a deed 
purporting to convey with general warranty the farm to him in fee 
simple. Pursuant to this deed Foreman took possession of the farm, 
lived on it and built a handsome residence on it and made other 
improvements, costing in all $40,000. Payne died in January, 1957, 
and Foreman in July,1960. 
Brown died intestate in 1912, leaving as his only surviving 
relative a nephew who now consults you, telling you that he knew 
nothing about the land transaction until last week when he 
accidently discovered a copy of the deed given by Payne; that the 
land itself is now worth $20,000, and, with the improvements 
which Foreman made, will bring $70,000, on todayis market. Nephew 
asks you to advise him fully as to his rights with respect to the 
farm and the improvements, which are now in the possession of Kent, 
who purchased the property from Foreman's heirs in 1965 and now 
claims to be its owner. 
How ought you to advise him? 
4. Crabbed, a crusty old bachelor, but mentally competent, 
in 1940 delivered and had recorded a deed conveying valuable real 
estate in Virginia to a friend, Mary, then aged 60 years, "for 
forty years with remainder to the University of Virginia." Crabbed 
died intestate in 1956, and in 1967, his heirs at law instituted 
appropriate proceedings to have this deed declared void. Mary, 
who was still living, and the University were made parties 
defendant. 
Assuming that the above facts were alleged and proven, 
how ought the Courtto hold? 
5. .Farmer included in his will the following provision: 
"I bequeath to my wife for her life with remainder at her death 
to John, son •f my first marriage, the following property (a) 
my dairy herd, (b) my stock in the City Bank, consisting of one 
hundred shares, and (c) my two hundred shares of Jupiter, Inc~" 
Two years after Farmer's death, City Bank paid each share-
holder $25.00 per share as a return of capital, and Jupiter 
declared a stock dividend. John and his stepmother each claim the 
return of capital and the stock dividend. John also insists that 
his stepmother must keep enough of the offspring to maintain the 
dairy herd at the same approximate number as it was at the time 
of Farmer's death. 
You are consulted. How should you answer the following 
questions: 
(a) What disposition should be made of the capital 
returned by City Bank? 
(b) Who is entitled to the Jupiter stock dividend? 
(c) Must the stepmother maintain the dairy herd at its 
strength as of Farmer's death? 
6. Allison, who owned a station wagon used for general 
family purposes, was approached by an acquaintance, Benton, about 
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moving a bar cabinet from one part of town to another. Caldwell, 
a friend of Benton, overheard the discussion and stated that he 
had a stuffed gnu that he wanted to move. Allison suggested that 
if Caldwell would help move the bar, then he would move the 
stuffed gnu. The next day the three men met and moved the bar, 
with each one having two drinks of whiskey from the well-stocked 
bar. They then loaded Caldwell's gnu, and enroute to their 
destination, while Allison was driving in a line of traffic with-
in the speed limit, his attention was attracted by Jane Mainesfeld, 
a well-proportioned young lady in a miniskirt, walking along the 
sidewalk and as they passed, Allison turned his head for about a 
second to gain a well-rounded view. When he looked back, he saw 
to his dismay that the traffic ahead had stopped and he crashed 
into the car in front of him, causing the stuffed gnu to topple 
on Caldwell and seriously injure him. 
Caldwell consults you as to his rights, if any, against 
Allison to recover for his personal injuries. 
How would you advise him? 
7. Deadbeat was employed by Puritan as a clothing salesman 
working on a commission basis in Norfolk, Virginia. Deadbeat 
owed Strongarm a nine-month past-due indebtedness of $400, for 
which demand fo_r payment repeatedly had been made. Deadbeat 
paid Strongarm, but through negligent mishandling of his records, 
Strongarm did not credit Deadbeat's account and subsequently 
wrote a letter to Puritan as follows: 
"Your employee Deadbeat has owed us $400 for 
almost a year and has consistently refused to pay 
the same. We know that you would take a dim view 
of an employee of yours acting in this way toward a 
creditor and feel that if you explain to him his 
responsibilities and liabilities and possible effects 
of the same upon himself, he would be induced to make 
payment to us." 
Puritan showed Deadbeat the letter and angrily lectured him, 
but upon being assured that the debt had been paid, Puritan told 
Deadbeat not to let it happen again and sent him back to work . .. 
Deadbeat brought an action at law against Strongarm by 
a motion for judgment, and the paragraph of the motion for judg-
ment stating his alleged cause of action was as follows: 
"Strongarm did wrongfully, unlawfully and with 
malice write and publish to Puritan a letter which 
wrongfully and mistakenly alleged that Deadbeat was 
indebted to Strongarm, with intent to force payment 
which was not due and/or to induce Puritan to discharge 
Deadbeat, all to the humiliation, ridicule,and em-
barrassment of the plaintiff(, Deadbeat, for which he 
is entitled to compensation.' 
(a) Does plaintiff, Deadbeat, have a substantive 
cause of action on which he may recover? 
(b) Is the quoted paragraph of the motion sufficient 
as to form? 
8. Playgirl invited Shyman to her home for a cozy dinner, 
during which she asked Shyman to fetch another bottle of champagne 
from the cellar. Upon descending to the dimly lighted basement 
and turning the corner of a stairway, Shyman'S left leg was impaled 
on the splintered end of a wooden board which Playgirl had left 
wedged in the side of the stairwell after her last karate practice 
session. Shyman ascertained that Dr. Quackenbush was considered to 
be a competent and qualified physician and went to him for treat-
ment of his leg wound, during the course of which, ~r. Quackenbush 
overlooked removing one of twelve minute splinters deeply imbedded 
in theleg, which, other consulting physicians agreed, would have 
been most difficult to detect even by the most careful examination. 
After Shyman recovered from the initial disability of the 
actual wounds, an infection set in from the splinter which re-
quired treatment and caused a subsequent disability. After recovery 
from this and after the scars were well healed-and though they 
were slightly unsightly only, Shyman went to Dr. Newskin, a 
plastic surgeon-considered to be competent and qualified, for 
revision of the scars on his leg. During this operation, Dr. 
Newskin left a small sponge under the skin at one incision site, 
and though Shyman complained of pain, Dr. Newskin ignored the 
complaints and did nothing and left town for several w~eks with 
the result that serious complications set in and Shyman was again 
disabled. 
Consulting physicians advised that the sponge could have been 
discovered at the time of closing the incision and an examination 
afterward would have also revealed the same under the skin. 
Shyman consults you as to his rights of recovery, if any, 
against Playgirl for: 
(1) the initial injury and disability, . 
(2) the infection and second disability while under 
the treatment of Dr. Quackenbush, and 
(3) the third disability as the result of Dr. Newskin's 
treatment. 
9. A written memorandum was signed by both parties, who 
were residents of Virginia, stating as follows: 
"Sold to L. F. Benton by o. T. Sully one carload, 
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28 tons, 40% soy bean meal, bagged, at $90 
per ton wholesale. Delivered Beetletown, 
Virginia. For November shipment. Dated 
November 4, 1966." 
Sully obtained the meal from a processor and had it shipped 
by rail on November 27, 1966, with the bill of lading showing 
28 tons. Benton had not received the meal by December 3, and 
called Sully repeatedly advising that he had to have the same 
for his customers. On December 4, the retail price of meal 
dropped from $100 to $80 per ton. On December 5, 1966, the car 
arrived at the siding, but the seal on the door was broken_. and 
the car only contained 20 tons of meal. The usual shipping time 
of such a shipment was 5 to 12 days. 
Benton refused to accept the shipment and so advised Sully 
and refused to pay for the meal. Sully advised Benton that he 
would charge for 20 tons only or would divert another shipment of 
meal. Sully found another shipment and diverted it, the second 
car containing 8 tons of meal arriving at Beetletown on December 
10. Benton continued to refuse acceptance of any of the meal or 
make payment for the_same. Sully later managed to sell the meal 
at $70 a ton wholesale and brought an action at law against 
3anton in a proper court for the difference of $20 per ton for 
28 tons Qf meal~ · 
Who should prevail in this action? 
10. Slick approached Manufacturer, falsely representing 
himself as being the sales manager for Collier, and offered on 
behalf of Collier to sell and deliver to Manufacturer ten tons 
of coal at $15 per ton. Manufacturer accepted the offer and 
Slick, without Collier's knowledge, went to Collier's storage yard, 
loaded ten tons on his truck and while on the way to Manufacturer's 
factory, negligently injured Pedestrian, but nevertheless delivered 
the coal to Manufacturer. Collier missed some coal and, upon 
investigation, learned the above facts, but coal having fallen in 
price he demanded payment of $15 per ton from Manufacturer, wpo 
declined to pay. 
Thereupon, Collier instituted· an action against Manufacturer 
for the purchase price of the coal. Pedestrian, learning of the 
action, demanded damages from Collier, who now asks your advice as 
to his liability for Pedestrian's injuries. 
How ought you to advise Collier? 
